Filtered by vendor Bluproducts Subscriptions
Total 5 CVE
CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2023-45866 7 Apple, Bluproducts, Canonical and 4 more 17 Ipados, Iphone Os, Iphone Se and 14 more 2024-12-12 6.3 Medium
Bluetooth HID Hosts in BlueZ may permit an unauthenticated Peripheral role HID Device to initiate and establish an encrypted connection, and accept HID keyboard reports, potentially permitting injection of HID messages when no user interaction has occurred in the Central role to authorize such access. An example affected package is bluez 5.64-0ubuntu1 in Ubuntu 22.04LTS. NOTE: in some cases, a CVE-2020-0556 mitigation would have already addressed this Bluetooth HID Hosts issue.
CVE-2021-41850 3 Bluproducts, Luna, Wikomobile 10 G9, G90, G90 Firmware and 7 more 2024-11-21 7.8 High
An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. A pre-installed app with a package name of com.skyroam.silverhelper writes three IMEI values to system properties at system startup. The system property values can be obtained via getprop by all third-party applications co-located on the device, even those with no permissions granted, exposing the IMEI values to processes without enforcing any access control.
CVE-2021-41849 3 Bluproducts, Luna, Wikomobile 10 G9, G90, G90 Firmware and 7 more 2024-11-21 5.5 Medium
An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. It sends the following Personally Identifiable Information (PII) in plaintext using HTTP to servers located in China: user's list of installed apps and device International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI). This PII is transmitted to log.skyroam.com.cn using HTTP, independent of whether the user uses the Simo software.
CVE-2021-41848 3 Bluproducts, Luna, Wikomobile 10 G9, G90, G90 Firmware and 7 more 2024-11-21 7.8 High
An issue was discovered in Luna Simo PPR1.180610.011/202001031830. It mishandles software updates such that local third-party apps can provide a spoofed software update file that contains an arbitrary shell script and arbitrary ARM binary, where both will be executed as the root user with an SELinux domain named osi. To exploit this vulnerability, a local third-party app needs to have write access to external storage to write the spoofed update at the expected path. The vulnerable system binary (i.e., /system/bin/osi_bin) does not perform any authentication of the update file beyond ensuring that it is encrypted with an AES key (that is hard-coded in the vulnerable system binary). Processes executing with the osi SELinux domain can programmatically perform the following actions: install apps, grant runtime permissions to apps (including permissions with protection levels of dangerous and development), access extensive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) using the programmatically grant permissions, uninstall apps, set the default launcher app to a malicious launcher app that spoofs other apps, set a network proxy to intercept network traffic, unload kernel modules, set the default keyboard to a keyboard that has keylogging functionality, examine notification contents, send text messages, and more. The spoofed update can optionally contain an arbitrary ARM binary that will be locally stored in internal storage and executed at system startup to achieve persistent code execution as the root user with the osi SELinux domain. This ARM binary will continue to execute at startup even if the app that provided the spoofed update is uninstalled.
CVE-2016-6564 7 Beeline, Bluproducts, Doogee and 4 more 38 Pro 2, Pro 2 Firmware, Studio 6.0 Hd and 35 more 2024-11-21 N/A
Android devices with code from Ragentek contain a privileged binary that performs over-the-air (OTA) update checks. Additionally, there are multiple techniques used to hide the execution of this binary. This behavior could be described as a rootkit. This binary, which resides as /system/bin/debugs, runs with root privileges and does not communicate over an encrypted channel. The binary has been shown to communicate with three hosts via HTTP: oyag[.]lhzbdvm[.]com oyag[.]prugskh[.]net oyag[.]prugskh[.]com Server responses to requests sent by the debugs binary include functionalities to execute arbitrary commands as root, install applications, or update configurations. Examples of a request sent by the client binary: POST /pagt/agent?data={"name":"c_regist","details":{...}} HTTP/1. 1 Host: 114.80.68.223 Connection: Close An example response from the server could be: HTTP/1.1 200 OK {"code": "01", "name": "push_commands", "details": {"server_id": "1" , "title": "Test Command", "comments": "Test", "commands": "touch /tmp/test"}} This binary is reported to be present in the following devices: BLU Studio G BLU Studio G Plus BLU Studio 6.0 HD BLU Studio X BLU Studio X Plus BLU Studio C HD Infinix Hot X507 Infinix Hot 2 X510 Infinix Zero X506 Infinix Zero 2 X509 DOOGEE Voyager 2 DG310 LEAGOO Lead 5 LEAGOO Lead 6 LEAGOO Lead 3i LEAGOO Lead 2S LEAGOO Alfa 6 IKU Colorful K45i Beeline Pro 2 XOLO Cube 5.0