An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet data by reading 2 bytes from the packet data. A buffer is then allocated to contain the entire packet, the size of which is calculated as the length of the packet body determined earlier and the header length. If the allocate fails because the specified packet is too large, no exception handling occurs and hciTrSerialRxIncoming continues to write bytes into the 4-byte large temporary header buffer, leading to a buffer overflow. This can be leveraged into an arbitrary write by an attacker. It is possible to overwrite the pointer to the buffer that is supposed to receive the contents of the packet body but which couldn't be allocated. One can then overwrite the state variable used by the function to determine which step of the parsing process is currently being executed. This advances the function to the next state, where it proceeds to copy data to that arbitrary location. The packet body is then written wherever the corrupted data pointer is pointing.
History

Mon, 25 Nov 2024 21:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Mbed
Mbed mbed
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:mbed:mbed:6.16.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Mbed
Mbed mbed
Metrics ssvc

{'options': {'Automatable': 'yes', 'Exploitation': 'none', 'Technical Impact': 'partial'}, 'version': '2.0.3'}


Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Arm
Arm mbed
Weaknesses CWE-120
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:arm:mbed:6.16.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Arm
Arm mbed
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.5, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N'}


Wed, 20 Nov 2024 20:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description An issue was discovered in MBed OS 6.16.0. During processing of HCI packets, the software dynamically determines the length of the packet data by reading 2 bytes from the packet data. A buffer is then allocated to contain the entire packet, the size of which is calculated as the length of the packet body determined earlier and the header length. If the allocate fails because the specified packet is too large, no exception handling occurs and hciTrSerialRxIncoming continues to write bytes into the 4-byte large temporary header buffer, leading to a buffer overflow. This can be leveraged into an arbitrary write by an attacker. It is possible to overwrite the pointer to the buffer that is supposed to receive the contents of the packet body but which couldn't be allocated. One can then overwrite the state variable used by the function to determine which step of the parsing process is currently being executed. This advances the function to the next state, where it proceeds to copy data to that arbitrary location. The packet body is then written wherever the corrupted data pointer is pointing.
References

cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: mitre

Published: 2024-11-20T00:00:00

Updated: 2024-11-25T21:08:30.415Z

Reserved: 2024-10-11T00:00:00

Link: CVE-2024-48985

cve-icon Vulnrichment

Updated: 2024-11-25T21:01:54.666Z

cve-icon NVD

Status : Modified

Published: 2024-11-20T20:15:19.270

Modified: 2024-11-25T22:15:14.790

Link: CVE-2024-48985

cve-icon Redhat

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