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19586 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2023-54004 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udplite: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __sk_mem_raise_allocated(). syzbot reported [0] a null-ptr-deref in sk_get_rmem0() while using IPPROTO_UDPLITE (0x88): 14:25:52 executing program 1: r0 = socket$inet6(0xa, 0x80002, 0x88) We had a similar report [1] for probably sk_memory_allocated_add() in __sk_mem_raise_allocated(), and commit c915fe13cbaa ("udplite: fix NULL pointer dereference") fixed it by setting .memory_allocated for udplite_prot and udplitev6_prot. To fix the variant, we need to set either .sysctl_wmem_offset or .sysctl_rmem. Now UDP and UDPLITE share the same value for .memory_allocated, so we use the same .sysctl_wmem_offset for UDP and UDPLITE. [0]: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 6829 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/28/2023 RIP: 0010:sk_get_rmem0 include/net/sock.h:2907 [inline] RIP: 0010:__sk_mem_raise_allocated+0x806/0x17a0 net/core/sock.c:3006 Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 23 0f 00 00 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 98 38 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 da 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 d8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 0f 8d 6f 0a 00 00 8b RSP: 0018:ffffc90005d7f450 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004d92000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff88066482 RDI: ffffffff8e2ccbb8 RBP: ffff8880173f7000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000030000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000340 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0063) knlGS:00000000f7f1cb40 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002e82f000 CR3: 0000000034ff0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 Call Trace: <TASK> __sk_mem_schedule+0x6c/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3077 udp_rmem_schedule net/ipv4/udp.c:1539 [inline] __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0x776/0xb30 net/ipv4/udp.c:1581 __udpv6_queue_rcv_skb net/ipv6/udp.c:666 [inline] udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0xc39/0x16c0 net/ipv6/udp.c:775 udpv6_queue_rcv_skb+0x194/0xa10 net/ipv6/udp.c:793 __udp6_lib_mcast_deliver net/ipv6/udp.c:906 [inline] __udp6_lib_rcv+0x1bda/0x2bd0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1013 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2e7/0x1250 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:437 ip6_input_finish+0x150/0x2f0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:482 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline] ip6_input+0xa0/0xd0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491 ip6_mc_input+0x40b/0xf50 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:585 dst_input include/net/dst.h:468 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:297 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0x250/0x380 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x114/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5491 __netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5605 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:5691 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x133/0x7a0 net/core/dev.c:5750 tun_rx_batched+0x4b3/0x7a0 drivers/net/tun.c:1553 tun_get_user+0x2452/0x39c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1989 tun_chr_write_iter+0xdf/0x200 drivers/net/tun.c:2035 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1868 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x945/0xd50 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x12b/0x250 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:112 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x65/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:178 do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:203 entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x70/0x82 RIP: 0023:0xf7f21579 Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 8d b4 26 00 00 00 00 ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2025-68191 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp_tunnel: use netdev_warn() instead of netdev_WARN() netdev_WARN() uses WARN/WARN_ON to print a backtrace along with file and line information. In this case, udp_tunnel_nic_register() returning an error is just a failed operation, not a kernel bug. udp_tunnel_nic_register() can fail due to a memory allocation failure (kzalloc() or udp_tunnel_nic_alloc()). This is a normal runtime error and not a kernel bug. Replace netdev_WARN() with netdev_warn() accordingly. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54037 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: prevent NULL pointer deref during reload Calling ethtool during reload can lead to call trace, because VSI isn't configured for some time, but netdev is alive. To fix it add rtnl lock for VSI deconfig and config. Set ::num_q_vectors to 0 after freeing and add a check for ::tx/rx_rings in ring related ethtool ops. Add proper unroll of filters in ice_start_eth(). Reproduction: $watch -n 0.1 -d 'ethtool -g enp24s0f0np0' $devlink dev reload pci/0000:18:00.0 action driver_reinit Call trace before fix: [66303.926205] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [66303.926259] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [66303.926286] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [66303.926311] PGD 0 P4D 0 [66303.926332] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [66303.926358] CPU: 4 PID: 933821 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.4.0-rc5+ #1 [66303.926400] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.00.01.0014.070920180847 07/09/2018 [66303.926446] RIP: 0010:ice_get_ringparam+0x22/0x50 [ice] [66303.926649] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 c0 09 00 00 c7 46 04 e0 1f 00 00 c7 46 10 e0 1f 00 00 48 8b 50 20 <48> 8b 12 0f b7 52 3a 89 56 14 48 8b 40 28 48 8b 00 0f b7 40 58 48 [66303.926722] RSP: 0018:ffffad40472f39c8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [66303.926749] RAX: ffff98a8ada05828 RBX: ffff98a8c46dd060 RCX: ffffad40472f3b48 [66303.926781] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff98a8c46dd068 RDI: ffff98a8b23c4000 [66303.926811] RBP: ffffad40472f3b48 R08: 00000000000337b0 R09: 0000000000000000 [66303.926843] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff98a8b23c4000 [66303.926874] R13: ffff98a8c46dd060 R14: 000000000000000f R15: ffffad40472f3a50 [66303.926906] FS: 00007f6397966740(0000) GS:ffff98b390900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [66303.926941] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [66303.926967] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000011ac20002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 [66303.926999] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [66303.927029] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [66303.927060] PKRU: 55555554 [66303.927075] Call Trace: [66303.927094] <TASK> [66303.927111] ? __die+0x23/0x70 [66303.927140] ? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0 [66303.927176] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [66303.927209] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 [66303.927244] ? ice_get_ringparam+0x22/0x50 [ice] [66303.927433] rings_prepare_data+0x62/0x80 [66303.927469] ethnl_default_doit+0xe2/0x350 [66303.927501] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xe3/0x140 [66303.927538] genl_rcv_msg+0x1b1/0x2c0 [66303.927561] ? __pfx_ethnl_default_doit+0x10/0x10 [66303.927590] ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [66303.927615] netlink_rcv_skb+0x58/0x110 [66303.927644] genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [66303.927665] netlink_unicast+0x19e/0x290 [66303.927691] netlink_sendmsg+0x254/0x4d0 [66303.927717] sock_sendmsg+0x93/0xa0 [66303.927743] __sys_sendto+0x126/0x170 [66303.927780] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [66303.928593] do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x90 [66303.929370] ? __count_memcg_events+0x60/0xa0 [66303.930146] ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x1a/0x30 [66303.930920] ? handle_mm_fault+0x9e/0x350 [66303.931688] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x258/0x740 [66303.932452] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x180 [66303.933193] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc | ||||
| CVE-2025-68770 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bnxt_en: Fix XDP_TX path For XDP_TX action in bnxt_rx_xdp(), clearing of the event flags is not correct. __bnxt_poll_work() -> bnxt_rx_pkt() -> bnxt_rx_xdp() may be looping within NAPI and some event flags may be set in earlier iterations. In particular, if BNXT_TX_EVENT is set earlier indicating some XDP_TX packets are ready and pending, it will be cleared if it is XDP_TX action again. Normally, we will set BNXT_TX_EVENT again when we successfully call __bnxt_xmit_xdp(). But if the TX ring has no more room, the flag will not be set. This will cause the TX producer to be ahead but the driver will not hit the TX doorbell. For multi-buf XDP_TX, there is no need to clear the event flags and set BNXT_AGG_EVENT. The BNXT_AGG_EVENT flag should have been set earlier in bnxt_rx_pkt(). The visible symptom of this is that the RX ring associated with the TX XDP ring will eventually become empty and all packets will be dropped. Because this condition will cause the driver to not refill the RX ring seeing that the TX ring has forever pending XDP_TX packets. The fix is to only clear BNXT_RX_EVENT when we have successfully called __bnxt_xmit_xdp(). | ||||
| CVE-2025-68322 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Avoid crash due to unaligned access in unwinder Guenter Roeck reported this kernel crash on his emulated B160L machine: Starting network: udhcpc: started, v1.36.1 Backtrace: [<104320d4>] unwind_once+0x1c/0x5c [<10434a00>] walk_stackframe.isra.0+0x74/0xb8 [<10434a6c>] arch_stack_walk+0x28/0x38 [<104e5efc>] stack_trace_save+0x48/0x5c [<105d1bdc>] set_track_prepare+0x44/0x6c [<105d9c80>] ___slab_alloc+0xfc4/0x1024 [<105d9d38>] __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x58/0x90 [<105dc80c>] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2ac/0x4a0 [<105b8e54>] __anon_vma_prepare+0x60/0x280 [<105a823c>] __vmf_anon_prepare+0x68/0x94 [<105a8b34>] do_wp_page+0x8cc/0xf10 [<105aad88>] handle_mm_fault+0x6c0/0xf08 [<10425568>] do_page_fault+0x110/0x440 [<10427938>] handle_interruption+0x184/0x748 [<11178398>] schedule+0x4c/0x190 BUG: spinlock recursion on CPU#0, ifconfig/2420 lock: terminate_lock.2+0x0/0x1c, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: ifconfig/2420, .owner_cpu: 0 While creating the stack trace, the unwinder uses the stack pointer to guess the previous frame to read the previous stack pointer from memory. The crash happens, because the unwinder tries to read from unaligned memory and as such triggers the unalignment trap handler which then leads to the spinlock recursion and finally to a deadlock. Fix it by checking the alignment before accessing the memory. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68320 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: lan966x: Fix sleeping in atomic context The following warning was seen when we try to connect using ssh to the device. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:575 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 104, name: dropbear preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 104 Comm: dropbear Tainted: G W 6.18.0-rc2-00399-g6f1ab1b109b9-dirty #530 NONE Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: Generic DT based system Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x7c/0xac dump_stack_lvl from __might_resched+0x16c/0x2b0 __might_resched from __mutex_lock+0x64/0xd34 __mutex_lock from mutex_lock_nested+0x1c/0x24 mutex_lock_nested from lan966x_stats_get+0x5c/0x558 lan966x_stats_get from dev_get_stats+0x40/0x43c dev_get_stats from dev_seq_printf_stats+0x3c/0x184 dev_seq_printf_stats from dev_seq_show+0x10/0x30 dev_seq_show from seq_read_iter+0x350/0x4ec seq_read_iter from seq_read+0xfc/0x194 seq_read from proc_reg_read+0xac/0x100 proc_reg_read from vfs_read+0xb0/0x2b0 vfs_read from ksys_read+0x6c/0xec ksys_read from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c Exception stack(0xf0b11fa8 to 0xf0b11ff0) 1fa0: 00000001 00001000 00000008 be9048d8 00001000 00000001 1fc0: 00000001 00001000 00000008 00000003 be905920 0000001e 00000000 00000001 1fe0: 0005404c be9048c0 00018684 b6ec2cd8 It seems that we are using a mutex in a atomic context which is wrong. Change the mutex with a spinlock. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68319 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netconsole: Acquire su_mutex before navigating configs hierarchy There is a race between operations that iterate over the userdata cg_children list and concurrent add/remove of userdata items through configfs. The update_userdata() function iterates over the nt->userdata_group.cg_children list, and count_extradata_entries() also iterates over this same list to count nodes. Quoting from Documentation/filesystems/configfs.rst: > A subsystem can navigate the cg_children list and the ci_parent pointer > to see the tree created by the subsystem. This can race with configfs' > management of the hierarchy, so configfs uses the subsystem mutex to > protect modifications. Whenever a subsystem wants to navigate the > hierarchy, it must do so under the protection of the subsystem > mutex. Without proper locking, if a userdata item is added or removed concurrently while these functions are iterating, the list can be accessed in an inconsistent state. For example, the list_for_each() loop can reach a node that is being removed from the list by list_del_init() which sets the nodes' .next pointer to point to itself, so the loop will never end (or reach the WARN_ON_ONCE in update_userdata() ). Fix this by holding the configfs subsystem mutex (su_mutex) during all operations that iterate over cg_children. This includes: - userdatum_value_store() which calls update_userdata() to iterate over cg_children - All sysdata_*_enabled_store() functions which call count_extradata_entries() to iterate over cg_children The su_mutex must be acquired before dynamic_netconsole_mutex to avoid potential lock ordering issues, as configfs operations may already hold su_mutex when calling into our code. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68318 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: thead: th1520-ap: set all AXI clocks to CLK_IS_CRITICAL The AXI crossbar of TH1520 has no proper timeout handling, which means gating AXI clocks can easily lead to bus timeout and thus system hang. Set all AXI clock gates to CLK_IS_CRITICAL. All these clock gates are ungated by default on system reset. In addition, convert all current CLK_IGNORE_UNUSED usage to CLK_IS_CRITICAL to prevent unwanted clock gating. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68316 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Fix invalid probe error return value After DME Link Startup, the error return value is set to the MIPI UniPro GenericErrorCode which can be 0 (SUCCESS) or 1 (FAILURE). Upon failure during driver probe, the error code 1 is propagated back to the driver probe function which must return a negative value to indicate an error, but 1 is not negative, so the probe is considered to be successful even though it failed. Subsequently, removing the driver results in an oops because it is not in a valid state. This happens because none of the callers of ufshcd_init() expect a non-negative error code. Fix the return value and documentation to match actual usage. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68312 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: Prevents free active kevent The root cause of this issue are: 1. When probing the usbnet device, executing usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0); put the kevent work in global workqueue. However, the kevent has not yet been scheduled when the usbnet device is unregistered. Therefore, executing free_netdev() results in the "free active object (kevent)" error reported here. 2. Another factor is that when calling usbnet_disconnect()->unregister_netdev(), if the usbnet device is up, ndo_stop() is executed to cancel the kevent. However, because the device is not up, ndo_stop() is not executed. The solution to this problem is to cancel the kevent before executing free_netdev(). | ||||
| CVE-2025-68311 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: serial: ip22zilog: Use platform device for probing After commit 84a9582fd203 ("serial: core: Start managing serial controllers to enable runtime PM") serial drivers need to provide a device in struct uart_port.dev otherwise an oops happens. To fix this issue for ip22zilog driver switch driver to a platform driver and setup the serial device in sgi-ip22 code. | ||||
| CVE-2023-54080 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: skip splitting and logical rewriting on pre-alloc write When doing a relocation, there is a chance that at the time of btrfs_reloc_clone_csums(), there is no checksum for the corresponding region. In this case, btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned()'s sum points to an invalid item and so ordered_extent's logical is set to some invalid value. Then, btrfs_lookup_block_group() in btrfs_zone_finish_endio() failed to find a block group and will hit an assert or a null pointer dereference as following. This can be reprodcued by running btrfs/028 several times (e.g, 4 to 16 times) with a null_blk setup. The device's zone size and capacity is set to 32 MB and the storage size is set to 5 GB on my setup. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f] CPU: 6 PID: 3105720 Comm: kworker/u16:13 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc6-kts+ #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X10SRL-F, BIOS 2.0 12/17/2015 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] Code: 41 54 49 89 fc 55 48 89 f5 53 e8 57 7d fc ff 48 8d b8 88 00 00 00 48 89 c3 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 > 3c 02 00 0f 85 02 01 00 00 f6 83 88 00 00 00 01 0f 84 a8 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88833cf87b08 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed102877b827 R10: ffff888143bdc13b R11: ffff888125b1cbc0 R12: ffff888143bdc000 R13: 0000000000007000 R14: ffff888125b1cba8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88881e500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f3ed85223d5 CR3: 00000001519b4005 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x148/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x19/0x160 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x7b8/0x1de0 [btrfs] ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 ? lock_release+0x47a/0x620 ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x59b/0x800 [btrfs] ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x358/0x800 [btrfs] ? __smp_call_single_queue+0x124/0x350 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 btrfs_work_helper+0x19f/0xc60 [btrfs] ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0 process_one_work+0x8c1/0x1430 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x52/0x60 worker_thread+0x100/0x12c0 ? __kthread_parkme+0xc1/0x1f0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2ea/0x3c0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> On the zoned mode, writing to pre-allocated region means data relocation write. Such write always uses WRITE command so there is no need of splitting and rewriting logical address. Thus, we can just skip the function for the case. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68310 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and generig PCI AER processing do. During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung: mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30 [<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8 [<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398 [<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0 INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8 [<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88 [<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168 [<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230 [<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there, too: - task: kmcheck mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of pci_cfg_access_lock() - task: kworker mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired the devlink lock. A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a crdump with > devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with > zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF> Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation, the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" - and we get a kernel log message of: mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5 because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying hardware. Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking access to PCI config space. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68308 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: kvaser_usb: leaf: Fix potential infinite loop in command parsers The `kvaser_usb_leaf_wait_cmd()` and `kvaser_usb_leaf_read_bulk_callback` functions contain logic to zero-length commands. These commands are used to align data to the USB endpoint's wMaxPacketSize boundary. The driver attempts to skip these placeholders by aligning the buffer position `pos` to the next packet boundary using `round_up()` function. However, if zero-length command is found exactly on a packet boundary (i.e., `pos` is a multiple of wMaxPacketSize, including 0), `round_up` function will return the unchanged value of `pos`. This prevents `pos` to be increased, causing an infinite loop in the parsing logic. This patch fixes this in the function by using `pos + 1` instead. This ensures that even if `pos` is on a boundary, the calculation is based on `pos + 1`, forcing `round_up()` to always return the next aligned boundary. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68760 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Fix potential out-of-bounds read in iommu_mmio_show In iommu_mmio_write(), it validates the user-provided offset with the check: `iommu->dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - 4`. This assumes a 4-byte access. However, the corresponding show handler, iommu_mmio_show(), uses readq() to perform an 8-byte (64-bit) read. If a user provides an offset equal to `mmio_phys_end - 4`, the check passes, and will lead to a 4-byte out-of-bounds read. Fix this by adjusting the boundary check to use sizeof(u64), which corresponds to the size of the readq() operation. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68306 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix kernel crash when releasing mtk iso interface When performing reset tests and encountering abnormal card drop issues that lead to a kernel crash, it is necessary to perform a null check before releasing resources to avoid attempting to release a null pointer. <4>[ 29.158070] Hardware name: Google Quigon sku196612/196613 board (DT) <4>[ 29.158076] Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work [bluetooth] <4>[ 29.158154] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) <4>[ 29.158162] pc : klist_remove+0x90/0x158 <4>[ 29.158174] lr : klist_remove+0x88/0x158 <4>[ 29.158180] sp : ffffffc0846b3c00 <4>[ 29.158185] pmr_save: 000000e0 <4>[ 29.158188] x29: ffffffc0846b3c30 x28: ffffff80cd31f880 x27: ffffff80c1bdc058 <4>[ 29.158199] x26: dead000000000100 x25: ffffffdbdc624ea3 x24: ffffff80c1bdc4c0 <4>[ 29.158209] x23: ffffffdbdc62a3e6 x22: ffffff80c6c07000 x21: ffffffdbdc829290 <4>[ 29.158219] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffffff80cd3e0648 x18: 000000031ec97781 <4>[ 29.158229] x17: ffffff80c1bdc4a8 x16: ffffffdc10576548 x15: ffffff80c1180428 <4>[ 29.158238] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 000000000000e380 x12: 0000000000000018 <4>[ 29.158248] x11: ffffff80c2a7fd10 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000100000000 <4>[ 29.158257] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x6 : 2d7223ff6364626d <4>[ 29.158266] x5 : 0000008000000000 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 2e7325006465636e <4>[ 29.158275] x2 : ffffffdc11afeff8 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdc11be4d0c <4>[ 29.158285] Call trace: <4>[ 29.158290] klist_remove+0x90/0x158 <4>[ 29.158298] device_release_driver_internal+0x20c/0x268 <4>[ 29.158308] device_release_driver+0x1c/0x30 <4>[ 29.158316] usb_driver_release_interface+0x70/0x88 <4>[ 29.158325] btusb_mtk_release_iso_intf+0x68/0xd8 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)] <4>[ 29.158347] btusb_mtk_reset+0x5c/0x480 [btusb (HASH:e8b6 5)] <4>[ 29.158361] hci_cmd_sync_work+0x10c/0x188 [bluetooth (HASH:a4fa 6)] <4>[ 29.158430] process_scheduled_works+0x258/0x4e8 <4>[ 29.158441] worker_thread+0x300/0x428 <4>[ 29.158448] kthread+0x108/0x1d0 <4>[ 29.158455] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 <0>[ 29.158467] Code: 91343000 940139d1 f9400268 927ff914 (f9401297) <4>[ 29.158474] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- <0>[ 29.167129] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception <2>[ 29.167144] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs <4>[ 29.167158] ------------[ cut here ]------------ | ||||
| CVE-2025-68305 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind There is a potential race condition between sock bind and socket write iter. bind may free the same cmd via mgmt_pending before write iter sends the cmd, just as syzbot reported in UAF[1]. Here we use hci_dev_lock to synchronize the two, thereby avoiding the UAF mentioned in [1]. [1] syzbot reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888077164818 by task syz.0.17/5989 Call Trace: mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316 set_link_security+0x5c2/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1918 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195 Allocated by task 5989: mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296 set_link_security+0x557/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1910 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195 Freed by task 5991: mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline] mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257 mgmt_index_removed+0x112/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9477 hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314 | ||||
| CVE-2025-68304 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn't ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU") and not clear if it had purpose since then. Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere than the ordered hdev->workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g. commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync") introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before it. It's better to do the locking so that even if these run concurrently no UAF is possible. Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup. syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue: [Task hdev->workqueue] [Task 2] hci_disconnect_all_sync l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon) hci_conn_get(hcon) hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon) hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_conn_del(hcon) v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock hci_conn_put(hcon) conn = hcon->l2cap_data (UAF) | ||||
| CVE-2025-68303 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: intel: punit_ipc: fix memory corruption This passes the address of the pointer "&punit_ipcdev" when the intent was to pass the pointer itself "punit_ipcdev" (without the ampersand). This means that the: complete(&ipcdev->cmd_complete); in intel_punit_ioc() will write to a wrong memory address corrupting it. | ||||
| CVE-2025-68302 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-04-15 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sxgbe: fix potential NULL dereference in sxgbe_rx() Currently, when skb is null, the driver prints an error and then dereferences skb on the next line. To fix this, let's add a 'break' after the error message to switch to sxgbe_rx_refill(), which is similar to the approach taken by the other drivers in this particular case, e.g. calxeda with xgmac_rx(). Found during a code review. | ||||
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