Filtered by vendor Netty
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Total
118 CVE
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-100655 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-29 | 7.5 High |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100663 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-28 | 7.5 High |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not special-case HTTP/1 CONNECT authority-form request-targets when converting HTTP/1 messages to HTTP/3 in HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers. The authority-form target (e.g., "CONNECT trusted.example:443") is parsed as a URI, so its host is emitted as :scheme, :path is set to "/", and the HTTP/1 Host header is used as :authority; if no Host header is present the CONNECT target is dropped. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 proxy or gateway, a remote client can send a CONNECT request whose Host header names a different authority than the request-target, producing a malformed HTTP/3 CONNECT whose tunnel :authority is attacker-controlled. This can bypass tunnel allow-lists, egress policy, backend selection, or audit controls that validate the HTTP/1 CONNECT request-target before forwarding over HTTP/3. The issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100659 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-28 | 6.5 Medium |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) in versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final does not enforce the RFC 9114 requirement that the :authority pseudo-header field and a literal host header field, when both present, carry the same value. A remote unauthenticated peer can send a single HEADERS frame containing both fields with differing, attacker-controlled values; the request is accepted and delivered to the application with two conflicting authorities, allowing routing, virtual-host, and access-control decisions to be bypassed when different components in the request path consult different fields. This issue is fixed in 4.2.18.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100664 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-28 | 7.5 High |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) versions 4.2.2.Final through 4.2.17.Final builds the HTTP/3 :authority pseudo-header from the HTTP/1 Host header before considering the authority of an absolute-form HTTP/1 request-target. In HttpConversionUtil.toHttp3Headers(HttpMessage, boolean) — reached via Http3FrameToHttpObjectCodec(false) — a non-empty Host header takes precedence over the request-target authority, contrary to the HTTP/1.1 rule that a server receiving an absolute-form request-target must ignore the Host header. In a Netty-based HTTP/1-to-HTTP/3 gateway, proxy, or protocol bridge, a remote client can send a request such as "GET https://trusted.example/admin HTTP/1.1" with "Host: attacker.example", causing components that validate, authorize, or route on the RFC-defined request-target authority to reach a different decision than the upstream HTTP/3 peer, which receives :authority derived from the conflicting Host header. This authority confusion can affect virtual-host routing, allow-list checks, backend selection, cache keys, and URL generation. The advisory reports integrity impact only (no code execution, memory corruption, or availability impact). Fixed in 4.2.18.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-100660 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-28 | 7.5 High |
| Netty's HTTP/3 codec (io.netty:netty-codec-http3) from 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.17.Final retains unbounded per-stream QPACK encoder state. QpackEncoder stores a queue and a dynamic-table index tracker for every encoded field section that references the QPACK dynamic table, keyed by the peer-controlled QUIC stream ID, and these entries are released only when the remote decoder sends a Section Acknowledgment or Stream Cancellation instruction — not when the HTTP/3 stream completes. There is no limit on the number of tracked streams, field sections, or retained bytes. A remote, unauthenticated HTTP/3 client can advertise a non-zero QPACK dynamic-table capacity, acknowledge the table insertion so the server reuses a dynamically indexed response header, and then omit all mandatory Section Acknowledgments while issuing sequential requests over a single QUIC connection, bypassing concurrent-stream limits and causing unbounded heap growth until the server exhausts memory (denial of service). Fixed in 4.2.18.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-56818 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, the RedisArrayAggregator Redis codec clears retained partial aggregate state when the maxNestedArrayDepth limit is exceeded, but it does not clear the same state when the sibling maxElements limit is exceeded. A peer can start a valid RESP array, send a bulk string child, then send a nested array header longer than the configured maxElements. Netty throws a decoder exception in decodeRedisArrayHeader, but the existing partial aggregate remains retained in the handler. If the application leaves the channel alive after the exception, later messages are still consumed into the pre-error aggregate, allowing an unauthenticated peer to keep attacker-controlled aggregate state alive across a security-limit exception and pin retained pooled buffers. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-73507 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-23 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.xml.XmlFrameDecoder.decode() failed to preserve closing-tag parser state across invocations, so an unauthenticated remote attacker could trickle-feed repeated </ sequences that repeatedly rescanned the accumulated buffer and exhausted an EventLoop thread's CPU, causing denial of service with a maxFrameLength of 1 MB. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-73508 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.AbstractDnsRecord, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DefaultDnsRecordDecoder.decodeRecord(), and io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil.decompressDomainName() failed to release retained or newly allocated ByteBuf objects when IDN.toASCII() or encodeDomainName() rejected a malformed domain name, allowing unauthenticated remote DNS packets to leak direct memory incrementally until denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59902 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-23 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler limits incomplete messages and fragment counts but not maxBufferedBytes, allowing unauthenticated peers to exhaust memory with large SCTP fragments. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59903 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75595 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-22 | 9.1 Critical |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instead of the SNI-specific context. In deployments where per-SNI clientAuth=REQUIRE is the sole mutual TLS gate, the default SslContext uses clientAuth=NONE or clientAuth=OPTIONAL, and no application-layer certificate verification exists, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the protected route's mutual TLS requirement. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-75596 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-22 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, the default io.netty.handler.ssl.SniHandler constructors use the pre-handshake ClientHello aggregation path in handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java at io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode, where handshakeBuffer.clear() and writeBytes() recopy all previously received body bytes for every additional TLS record. An unauthenticated remote peer can advertise a large ClientHello and deliver its body in thousands of tiny records, causing quadratic CPU work on the event loop before the TLS handshake completes and degrading TLS handling for other clients. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89044 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 6.5 Medium |
| Netty versions 4.1.133.Final through 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.13.Final through 4.2.17.Final fail to properly validate the final transfer coding in the Transfer-Encoding header, allowing attackers to smuggle requests by using malformed encoding declarations. Attackers can split Transfer-Encoding headers across multiple lines or use values like 'chunked, xchunked' to bypass validation and decode messages as chunked when the final coding is not chunked, enabling request smuggling attacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-50011 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, RedisArrayAggregator pre-allocates ArrayList with initial capacity equal to the RESP array element count declared in an array header. That count is taken from the wire before the corresponding child messages exist. A small malicious header can claim a huge initial capacity. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-50010 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, SimpleTrustManagerFactory.engineGetTrustManagers() and related paths wrap any user-supplied plain X509TrustManager in X509TrustManagerWrapper, which extends X509ExtendedTrustManager but implements the 3-arg checkServerTrusted(chain, authType, SSLEngine) by discarding the SSLEngine and calling the 2-arg delegate. Because the object now IS an X509ExtendedTrustManager, neither SunJSSE's internal AbstractTrustManagerWrapper nor Netty's own OpenSslX509TrustManagerWrapper will re-wrap it to add endpoint-identification. Consequently, even though Netty 4.2 sets endpointIdentificationAlgorithm="HTTPS" by default, a client built with `SslContextBuilder.forClient().trustManager(somePlainX509TrustManager)` performs no hostname verification at all. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48059 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec in netty leaks native or heap memory on every connection when a client sends a syntactically valid header containing nested `PP2_TYPE_SSL` TLVs (type-length-value records) at depth two or greater. The leak occurs on the successful parse path — no exception is thrown, the message fires downstream, the decoder removes itself, and the application releases the `HAProxyMessage` normally. Yet the underlying cumulation buffer (a pooled, potentially direct `ByteBuf` allocated by the channel) remains permanently pinned. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48043 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 5.3 Medium |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-http2 prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener` class orchestrates HTTP/2 decompression by embedding a per-stream `EmbeddedChannel` that runs the appropriate decompression codec (gzip, deflate, zstd) and forwards decompressed chunks to a wrapped listener. Each decompressed chunk is a pooled `ByteBuf` handed to an anonymous `ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter` tail handler, which becomes the sole owner responsible for releasing it. A remote peer could send frames that would result in the flow-controller throwing and so trigger a resource leak which at the end might take down the whole JVM due OOME. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-48006 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the RedisArrayAggregator handler permanently leaks pooled direct-memory buffers when a Redis pipeline connection closes before a RESP array aggregate completes. The handler retains child messages in per-handler state (`depths` field) but defines no `channelInactive`, `handlerRemoved`, or `exceptionCaught` method to release them when the pipeline tears down. Because the leaked buffers are slices of `PooledByteBufAllocator` chunks, they prevent those chunks from being returned to the JVM-wide direct-memory pool. Repeated connection churn by any network peer monotonically drains this shared pool, eventually causing allocation failures on all Netty channels in the process. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-47691 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 8.7 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, Netty's `DnsResolveContext` insufficiently validates the bailiwick of NS records, enabling DNS Cache Poisoning. An attacker controlling an authoritative name server for a subdomain can poison the cache for parent domains (like `.co.uk`). In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext.AuthoritativeNameServerList#add` method accepts any NS record from the AUTHORITY section as long as the record's name is a suffix of the questionName. Subsequently, the `handleWithAdditional` method caches the associated A records from the ADDITIONAL section directly into the `authoritativeDnsServerCache` under the parent domain's key. This bypasses standard bailiwick rules, where a server authoritative for a subdomain should not be trusted to provide authoritative records for its parent. The poisoned cache is then used for all future resolutions under the parent domain's key. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46340 | 1 Netty | 1 Netty | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In versions of netty-transport-sctp prior to 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, for each non-complete SctpMessage fragment the handler does `fragments.put(streamId, Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(frag, byteBuf))`, wrapping the previous accumulator and the new slice into a *new* CompositeByteBuf every time. After N fragments the accumulator is an N-deep chain of composites, each holding references and component arrays; readableBytes()/getBytes() on the final buffer recurse N levels. There is no limit on N, on total bytes, or on the number of streamIdentifiers an attacker can open (each gets its own map entry). A peer that never sets the `complete` flag can grow this structure indefinitely from tiny 1-byte DATA chunks. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue. | ||||
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